Graphical potential games

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2016
Volume: 163
Issue: C
Pages: 889-899

Authors (2)

Babichenko, Yakov (not in RePEc) Tamuz, Omer (California Institute of Techno...)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the class of potential games that are also graphical games with respect to a given graph G of connections between the players. We show that, up to strategic equivalence, this class of games can be identified with the set of Markov random fields on G. From this characterization, and from the Hammersley–Clifford theorem, it follows that the potentials of such games can be decomposed into local potentials.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:163:y:2016:i:c:p:889-899
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29