Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games

C-Tier

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2009

Volume: 105

Issue: 3

Pages: 303-305

Authors (3)

Acocella, Nicola ("Sapienza" Università di Roma) Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni (not in RePEc) Piacquadio, Paolo G. (Universität St. Gallen)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

By introducing the concepts of implicit coalitions and conflict of interests in a multiple-player context, this paper generalizes some theorems on policy invariance and equilibrium existence and uniqueness for LQ policy games.

Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games

Authors (3)

Abstract

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