Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2020
Volume: 69
Issue: 4
Pages: 987-1021

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract We test the performance of myopic and farsighted stability concepts in a network formation experiment with a stream of payoffs and relatively unstructured link formation process. A subtle treatment variation demonstrates clearly the power of myopic stability concepts in precisely identifying the set of the most stable networks. However, we also find support for the predictions of farsighted concepts of stability, especially those that assume players’ pessimism about the eventual outcome of a deviation. This is the first study to demonstrate that there exist environments where farsighted stability concepts identify empirically stable networks that are not identified by myopic concepts. Thus, myopic stability concepts are not necessarily sufficient to predict all stable outcomes in empirical applications.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:69:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-019-01200-z
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29