Choosing Free Trade without Amending the U.S. Constitution.

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 1997
Volume: 90
Issue: 1-4
Pages: 185-200

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper documents the functioning of the market in trade protection. It uses a narrative approach to demonstrate that politicians respond to the demands of special interests by forcing open foreign markets and by closing domestic markets. In the process government officials violate property rights, disregard economic logic, damage the world trading system, multiply rent-seeking costs, and destroy wealth. Such outcomes imply that there is a constitutional failure, and that the rules and institutions governing international trade need to be reformed. This paper discusses several such changes and considers how consumers could be mobilized to support them. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:90:y:1997:i:1-4:p:185-200
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29