When managers cannot commit: Capital structure under inalienable managerial entrenchment

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2011
Volume: 110
Issue: 2
Pages: 107-109

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

When partially inalienable managerial entrenchment is introduced to Zwiebel's 1996 model of dynamic capital structure, anticipated debt renegotiation between a higher-type manager and the creditor reduces expected firm value. Only lower-type managers can issue debt to avoid shareholder takeover.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:2:p:107-109
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29