Bank pay caps, bank risk, and macroprudential regulation

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance
Year: 2014
Volume: 48
Issue: C
Pages: 139-151

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies the consequences of a regulatory pay cap in proportion to assets on bank risk, bank value, and bank asset allocations. The cap is shown to lower banks’ risk and raise banks’ values by acting against a competitive externality in the labour market. The risk reduction is achieved without the possibility of reduced lending from a Tier 1 increase. The cap encourages diversification and reduces the need a bank has to focus on a limited number of asset classes. The cap can be used for Macroprudential Regulation to encourage banks to move resources away from wholesale banking to the retail banking sector. Such an intervention would be targeted: in 2009 a 20% reduction in remuneration would have been equivalent to more than 150 basis points of extra Tier 1 for UBS, for example.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jbfina:v:48:y:2014:i:c:p:139-151
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29