Cognition and Incomplete Contracts

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2009
Volume: 99
Issue: 1
Pages: 265-94

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Thinking about contingencies, designing covenants, and seeing through their implications is costly. Parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete. The paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its consequences for contractual design. (JEL D23, D82, D86, L22)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:1:p:265-94
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29