Cross-checking optimal monetary policy with information from the Taylor rule

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 117
Issue: 1
Pages: 204-207

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper shows that monetary policy should be delegated to a central bank that cross-checks optimal policy with information from the Taylor rule. Placing some weight on deviations from a Taylor rule reduces the stabilization bias of discretionary monetary policy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:204-207
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29