Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 123
Issue: 2
Pages: 244-247

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Central banks face uncertainty about potential output. We model optimal monetary policy under discretion in a situation in which the central bank adopts a min–max approach to policy. The case for appointing a conservative central banker who puts a larger weight on inflation stabilization becomes stronger as the central bank’s concern about misspecifications increases.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:2:p:244-247
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29