A Theory of Legislative Organization: Making the Most of Your Majority

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1980
Volume: 94
Issue: 2
Pages: 261-277

Authors (2)

Arleen Leibowitz (not in RePEc) Robert Tollison

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this paper we seek to explain why legislative committees exist and what is the optimal number and size of committees in a legislature. Our theory is based on the idea that committees are a "sample" taken from the full house and on the assumption that the majority party seeks to maximize the proportion of its favored bills which are reviewed and passed in voting trials. We show that for a given size of majority fewer and larger committees lead to larger passage rates, if majority members do not always vote the party-line.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:94:y:1980:i:2:p:261-277.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29