Reflections on the failure of the Taylor principle under commitment

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2011
Volume: 112
Issue: 1
Pages: 71-74

Authors (2)

Barnea, Emanuel (Bank of Israel) Liviatan, Nissan (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We offer an explanation of why optimal policy under commitment requires weaker reaction to supply shock, reflected in the failure of the Taylor principle. This lesson seems to be prevalent among central banks and yet has been analyzed incomprehensively in the economic literature.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:71-74
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24