Exclusive Dealing and the Whiskey Trust, 1890–1895

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic History
Year: 1998
Volume: 58
Issue: 3
Pages: 755-778

Authors (1)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This article uses the history of the Whiskey Trust to explore the competitive effects of vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing. The Whiskey Trust distilled alcoholic spirits and bribed distributors not to carry competing brands of spirits. For the Whiskey Trust, exclusive dealing was an ineffective predatory strategy. Despite the trust's market dominance and manifold predatory strategies, it failed to preempt entry. The trust failed, in part, because its rivals could vertically integrate at low cost. Competition disciplined the trust more effectively than did numerous antitrust suits.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jechis:v:58:y:1998:i:03:p:755-778_02
Journal Field
Economic History
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29