Self-Persuasion: Evidence from Field Experiments at International Debating Competitions

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2022
Volume: 112
Issue: 4
Pages: 1118-46

Authors (3)

Peter Schwardmann (not in RePEc) Egon Tripodi (Hertie School) Joël J. van der Weele (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Laboratory evidence shows that when people have to argue for a given position, they persuade themselves about the position's factual and moral superiority. Such self-persuasion limits the potential of communication to resolve conflict and reduce polarization. We test for this phenomenon in a field setting, at international debating competitions that randomly assign experienced and motivated debaters to argue one side of a topical motion. We find self-persuasion in factual beliefs and confidence in one's position. Effect sizes are smaller than in the laboratory, but robust to a one-hour exchange of arguments and a tenfold increase in incentives for accuracy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:112:y:2022:i:4:p:1118-46
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29