A model to analyse financial fragility

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2006
Volume: 27
Issue: 1
Pages: 107-142

Authors (3)

Charles Goodhart (not in RePEc) Pojanart Sunirand (not in RePEc) Dimitrios Tsomocos (Oxford University)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper sets out a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour, to possible contagious inter-relationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit ‘excessive’ risk-taking. Our model is rich enough to include heterogeneous agents, endogenous default, and multiple commodity, and credit and deposit markets. Yet, it is simple enough to be effectively computable and can therefore be used as a practical framework to analyse financial fragility. Financial fragility in our model emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon. Among other results, a non-trivial quantity theory of money is derived, liquidity and default premia co-determine interest rates, and both regulatory and monetary policies have non-neutral effects. The model also indicates how monetary policy may affect financial fragility, thus highlighting the trade-off between financial stability and economic efficiency. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:107-142
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29