Dynamic Equilibrium with Costly Short-Selling and Lending Market

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2024
Volume: 37
Issue: 2
Pages: 444-506

Authors (3)

Adem Atmaz (not in RePEc) Suleyman Basak (Centre for Economic Policy Res...) Fangcheng Ruan (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We develop a dynamic model of costly stock short-selling and lending market and obtain implications that simultaneously support many empirical regularities related to short-selling. In our model, investors’ belief disagreement leads to shorting demand, whereby short-sellers pay shorting fees to borrow stocks from lenders. Our main novel results are as follows. Short interest is positively related to shorting fee and predicts stock returns negatively. Higher short-selling risk can be associated with lower stock returns and less short-selling activity. Stock volatility is increased under costly short-selling. An application to GameStop episode yields implications consistent with observed patterns.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:37:y:2024:i:2:p:444-506.
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24