Information aggregation with runoff voting

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2021
Volume: 191
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A majority of truth-seeking voters wants to choose the alternative that better matches the state of the world, but voters may disagree on which alternative is the best match due to private information. When we have an arbitrary number of alternatives and sophisticated partisan voters exist in the electorate, electing the correct alternative is challenging. We show that multi-round runoff voting achieves asymptotically full-information equivalence. That is, when the society is large, it can lead to the election of the correct alternative under fairly general assumptions regarding the information structure and partisans' preferences.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:191:y:2021:i:c:s002205312030123x
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29