Rationalizability of menu preferences

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2018
Volume: 65
Issue: 4
Pages: 917-934

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract The class of preferences over opportunity sets (“menus”) rationalizable by underlying preferences over the alternatives is characterized for the general case in which the dataset is unrestricted. In particular, both the universal set of alternatives and the domain of menus over which preferences are asserted by the decision maker are arbitrary. The key “Cover Dominance” axiom states that any menu strictly preferred to a collection of menus must be strictly preferred to any menu covered by the collection. The method of characterization relies upon transitivity of menu preferences, but completeness can be relaxed.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:65:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1043-2
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29