Duopolistic competition and monetary policy

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics
Year: 2023
Volume: 135
Issue: C
Pages: 70-85

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

To consider the strategic pricing of duopolistic firms and its implications for monetary policy, this study constructs a tractable duopoly model with price stickiness. Dynamic strategic complementarity, in which an increase in a firm’s price increases the optimal price set by the rival firm in the following periods, increases steady-state price and the real effect of monetary policy. However, when temporary sales arise as a mixed strategy, the real effect of monetary policy decreases considerably.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:moneco:v:135:y:2023:i:c:p:70-85
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29