Contracts and Money.

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 1997
Volume: 105
Issue: 4
Pages: 700-708

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Why are contracts not fully indexed? In a setting in which fully indexed contracts are feasible, the authors find that, when price-level data are gathered with delay, these contracts are not renegotiation-proof. The contracts that replace them entail a lower level of welfare for the parties to that contract. They also imply that real variables respond to nominal shocks. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:105:y:1997:i:4:p:700-708
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29