Central bank independence and macro-prudential regulation

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 125
Issue: 2
Pages: 327-330

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

When a central bank is in charge of both price and financial stability, a new time-inconsistency problem may arise. Monetary policy may be abused to reduce the private sector’s real debt burden after a financial shock materializes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:2:p:327-330
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29