Commitment with renegotiable debt contracts and verifiable cash flow

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 99
Issue: 2
Pages: 249-251

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study a Buyer-Seller relationship with one-sided relationship-specific investment. Debt commits the Seller not to trade at a low price even though it is renegotiable, and the cash flow is verifiable.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:249-251
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29