Destructive behavior in a Fragile Public Good game

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 123
Issue: 3
Pages: 295-299

Authors (4)

Hoyer, Maximilian (not in RePEc) Bault, Nadège (not in RePEc) Loerakker, Ben (not in RePEc) van Winden, Frans (Universiteit van Amsterdam)

Score contribution per author:

0.251 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment–like damaging public goods–is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:3:p:295-299
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29