Credit rating agencies and elections in emerging democracies: Guardians of fiscal discipline?

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 119
Issue: 3
Pages: 251-254

Authors (2)

Hanusch, Marek (not in RePEc) Vaaler, Paul M. (University of Minnesota)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Analyses of budget balances in 18 emerging presidential democracies observed prior to the financial crisis of 2008–2009 show that credit rating agencies induce fiscal discipline in election years, thus reducing incentives for governments to borrow opportunistically for short-term electoral gain.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:3:p:251-254
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29