How should we incentivize private landowners to ‘produce’ more biodiversity?

C-Tier
Journal: Oxford Review of Economic Policy
Year: 2012
Volume: 28
Issue: 1
Pages: 93-113

Authors (4)

Nick Hanley (University of Glasgow, Institu...) Simanti Banerjee (University of Nebraska) Gareth D. Lennox (not in RePEc) Paul R. Armsworth (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.251 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Globally, much biodiversity is found on private land. Acting to conserve such biodiversity thus requires the design of policies which influence the decision-making of farmers and foresters. In this paper, we outline the economic characteristics of this problem, before reviewing a number of policy options, such as conservation auctions and conservation easements. We then discuss a number of policy design problems, such as the need for spatial coordination and the choice between paying for outcomes rather than actions, before summarizing what the evidence and theory developed to date tell us about those aspects of biodiversity policy design which need careful attention from policy-makers and environmental regulators. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:oxford:v:28:y:2012:i:1:p:93-113
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24