The Creation and Capture of Rents: Wages and Innovation in a Panel of U. K. Companies

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1996
Volume: 111
Issue: 1
Pages: 195-226

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of technological innovation on wages using a panel of British firms. A head-count measure of major innovations between 1945 and 1983 is combined with share price and accounting information. Innovating firms are found to have higher average wages, but rival innovation tends to depress own wages. This appears consistent with a model where wages are partly determined by a sharing in the rents generated by innovation. In other words, innovation may be a good instrument for proxies for rents such as profitability, quasi rents, or Tobin's (average) Q. Instrumental variable estimates of the elasticity between wages and quasi rents are about 0.29.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:111:y:1996:i:1:p:195-226.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29