Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2015
Volume: 91
Issue: C
Pages: 186-206

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We explore the role of experience in mixed-strategy games by comparing, for a stylized version of Texas Hold-em, the behavior of experts, who have extensive experience playing poker online, to the behavior of novices. We find significant differences. The initial frequencies with which players bet and call are closer to equilibrium for experts than novices. And, while the betting and calling frequencies of both types of subjects exhibit too much heterogeneity to be consistent with equilibrium play, the frequencies of experts exhibit less heterogeneity. We find evidence that the style of online play transfers from the field to the lab.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:186-206
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29