Bounded Rationality and the Choice of Jury Selection Procedures

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Law and Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 61
Issue: 4
Pages: 711 - 738

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A peremptory-challenge procedure allows the parties to a jury trial to dismiss some prospective jurors without justification. Complex challenge procedures offer an unfair advantage to parties who are better able to strategize. I introduce a new measure of strategic complexity based on level-k thinking and use this measure to compare challenge procedures often used in practice. In applying this measure, I overturn some commonly held beliefs about which jury selection procedures are strategically simple.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/700198
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29