Intergovernmental fiscal transfers as pork barrel

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2013
Volume: 155
Issue: 3
Pages: 335-353

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze increases in intergovernmental fiscal transfers and associated vote changes in Portuguese legislative elections. The results suggest that election year increases in transfers by the central government to municipalities secure added votes, and that these transfers are targeted at jurisdictions where the government faces the risk of losing support. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:155:y:2013:i:3:p:335-353
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29