Pricing Schemes and Seller Fraud: Evidence from New York City Taxi Rides

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 67
Issue: 1
Pages: 56-90

Authors (3)

Ting Liu (not in RePEc) Estefania Vergara‐Cobos (not in RePEc) Yiyi Zhou (Stony Brook University - SUNY)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Different pricing schemes gives sellers different financial incentives to defraud consumers. Using rich microdata on New York City taxi rides, we examine the differences in traveled distance, duration and fare between trips taken by non‐local passengers and those by comparable local passengers. We find that, for trips subject to a two‐part tariff, the discrepancies are larger when the variable rate is higher, or when the expected post‐dropoff occupancy is lower; furthermore, the impact of the post‐dropoff occupancy is more pronounced when the variable rate is higher. In contrast, trips subject to a flat fare scheme do not exhibit these patterns.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:67:y:2019:i:1:p:56-90
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29