Closing coal: economic and moral incentives

C-Tier
Journal: Oxford Review of Economic Policy
Year: 2014
Volume: 30
Issue: 3
Pages: 492-512

Authors (2)

Paul Collier (not in RePEc) Anthony J. Venables (Oxford University)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Climate policy requires that much of the world’s reserves of fossil fuels remain unburned. This paper makes the case for implementing this directly through policy to close the global coal industry. Coal is singled out because of its high emissions intensity, low rents per unit value, local environmental costs, and sheer scale. Direct supply policy—the sequenced closure of coal mines—may lead to less policy leakage (across countries and time) than other policies based on demand or price management. It also has the advantage of involving relatively few players and leading to clear-cut and observable outcomes. Appropriately sequenced closure of the world coal industry could, we suggest, create the moral force needed to mobilize collective international action.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:oxford:v:30:y:2014:i:3:p:492-512.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29