Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2021
Volume: 127
Issue: C
Pages: 102-112

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The concept of unprejudiced beliefs equilibrium is simple: out-of-equilibrium beliefs should be consistent with the principle that multiple deviations are infinitely less likely than single deviations. Our questions are: does there always exist such an equilibrium and what can be done if there are multiple such equilibria?

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:127:y:2021:i:c:p:102-112
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29