The Punitive Damages Calculus: The Differential Incidence of State Punitive Damages Reforms

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 2017
Volume: 84
Issue: 1
Pages: 82-97

Authors (2)

Benjamin J. McMichael (not in RePEc) W. Kip Viscusi (Vanderbilt University)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

State punitive damages reforms have altered how courts award punitive damages. We model the decision to award punitive damages as a two‐step process involving the decision to award any punitive damages and the decision of what amount to award. Using samples of trial court verdicts from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, we find that punitive damages caps reduce the amount of damages awarded but do not affect whether they are initially awarded. Additionally, we find that maintaining lower evidentiary standards increases both the probability that punitive damages are awarded and the size of those awards.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:84:y:2017:i:1:p:82-97
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29