Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
International commitments to reduce emissions must be negotiated between countries in a manner considered to be fair or equitable. While the burden-sharing principles commonly advocated in climate negotiations reflect different views of what constitutes a fair way to distribute the abatement burden, their use can also be strategically motivated to legitimise a specific bargaining position. In this context, using a threshold public good game with a climate change framing, real monetary incentives and drawing on a sample of individuals from the United States, the European Union, China, India and South Africa, this multi-country study examines the degree to which the use of burden-sharing principles reflects material self-interest. In an initial treatment, participants, who represent the country of which they are a national, choose between various burden-sharing principles. In a subsequent treatment, drawing from Rawls׳ veil of ignorance, participants are unaware of which country they represent and are randomly allocated to a country after making their decision. A comparison of participants׳ choices across these two treatments indicates that the use of the historical and future polluter-pays rules by American and Chinese participants is consistent with material self-interest, or, in other words, self-interested use of burden-sharing principles.