Division of labor and the organization of knowledge in production: A laboratory experiment

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2021
Volume: 130
Issue: C
Pages: 196-210

Authors (3)

Klockmann, Victor (not in RePEc) von Schenk, Alicia (not in RePEc) von Siemens, Ferdinand A. (Goethe Universität Frankfurt a...)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Following Garicano (2000), we consider groups whose members decide what knowledge to acquire and how to use this knowledge in production. If efficient production requires common knowledge, all group members should become workers and acquire common knowledge. But if efficient production requires diverse knowledge, one group member should become manager, acquire rare knowledge, and stand ready to help the other workers. In our laboratory experiment, we find that most groups eventually manage to coordinate on an efficient division of labor. Still, we find substantial adoption frictions. Coordination takes time, and some groups coordinate on an inefficient division of labor, probably because they do not know what specialization of knowledge is most efficient.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:196-210
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29