Need and design of short-term auctions in the EU gas markets

B-Tier
Journal: Energy Policy
Year: 2013
Volume: 63
Issue: C
Pages: 484-493

Authors (2)

Vazquez, Miguel (European University Institute) Hallack, Michelle (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In the EU, gas markets are based on socializing network flexibility services. However, shippers have different preferences on network flexibility, which are not reflected in current allocation models. We propose the introduction of auction mechanisms to allocate network services in the short run. The auction aims to represent simultaneously the diversity of players′ preferences and the trade-offs implied by network constraints. Two sealed-bid auctions are proposed: (a) an auction based on bids for gas, which allocates network services through the minimization of gas price differences; (b) an auction with explicit bids for line-pack, which allows shippers′ valuation of line-pack storage.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:enepol:v:63:y:2013:i:c:p:484-493
Journal Field
Energy
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29