Getting Incentives Right? The Impact of Hospital Capitation Payment in Vietnam

B-Tier
Journal: Health Economics
Year: 2017
Volume: 26
Issue: 2
Pages: 263-272

Authors (4)

Ha Thi Hong Nguyen (not in RePEc) Sarah Bales (not in RePEc) Adam Wagstaff Huyen Dao (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper evaluates the impact on cost and utilization of a shift from fee‐for‐service to capitation payment of district hospitals by Vietnam's social health insurance agency. Hospital fixed effects analysis suggests that capitation leads to reduced costs. Hospitals also increased service provision to the uninsured who continue to pay out‐of‐pocket on a fee‐for‐service basis. The study points to the need to anticipate unintended effects of payment reforms, especially in the context of a multiple purchaser system. Copyright © The World Bank Health Economics © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:hlthec:v:26:y:2017:i:2:p:263-272
Journal Field
Health
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29