The Stability of the Interwar Gold Exchange Standard: Did Politics Matter?

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic History
Year: 2008
Volume: 68
Issue: 1
Pages: 151-181

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Economic historians have devoted enormous attention to the collapse of the interwar gold standard. This article proposes a discrete time duration model (using a panel data set of 24 countries for 1928–1936) to analyze how economic and political indicators affected a country's term on the gold standard. High per capita income, international creditor status, and prior hyperinflation increased the probability of continuation. In contrast, democratic regimes left early. Unemployment, sterling group membership, higher inflation, and the experience of banking crises reduced the time a country remained on the gold standard. This study also predicts sample countries' survival probabilities.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jechis:v:68:y:2008:i:01:p:151-181_00
Journal Field
Economic History
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29