Search platforms: showrooming and price parity clauses

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 51
Issue: 1
Pages: 32-58

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide a model in which consumers search for firms directly or through platforms. Platforms lower search costs but charge firms for the transactions they facilitate. Platform fees raise the possibility of showrooming, in which consumers search on a platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices. In settings like this, search platforms like Booking.com have adopted price parity clauses, requiring firms to offer their best prices on the platform, arguing this is needed to prevent showrooming. However, despite allowing for showrooming in our model, we find that price parity clauses often harm consumers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:51:y:2020:i:1:p:32-58
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29