Efficient resolution of partnership disputes

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2023
Volume: 54
Issue: 4
Pages: 543-569

Authors (3)

Daniel Fershtman (not in RePEc) Béla Szabadi (not in RePEc) Cédric Wasser (Universität Basel)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study efficient resolution of partnership disputes in which, departing from the partnership dissolution literature, dissolution need not be efficient. We characterize which disputes can be resolved efficiently under both one‐ and two‐sided private information, and show that unless a partnership is sufficiently ineffective, efficient resolution is impossible. We propose simple dispute‐resolution procedures implementing the efficient outcome whenever possible. Finally, we characterize second‐best mechanisms when efficient resolution is impossible and private information is one sided.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:54:y:2023:i:4:p:543-569
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29