Contracting officer workload, incomplete contracting, and contractual terms

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 45
Issue: 2
Pages: 395-421

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

type="main"> <p>This article estimates the causal effect of retirement-induced workload spikes on the selection of procurement terms. In a sample of 150,000 contracts from 85 procurement offices over 11 years, increases in workload decrease reliance on competitive acquisition procedures, decrease reliance on firm-fixed-price contracts, increase risk of renegotiation, and increase costs. These estimates are consistent with a model of endogenously incomplete contracting. The US federal government has experienced exceptional growth in acquisitions contracting over the past decade but limited growth in acquisitions manpower. This article provides some of the facts necessary to evaluate the consequences of these shifts.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:45:y:2014:i:2:p:395-421
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29