Multiple prizes in research tournaments

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2019
Volume: 175
Issue: C
Pages: 118-120

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A Fullerton–McAfee research tournament with multiple prizes is strategically equivalent to a sequential multi-prize Tullock contest. Contest designers, aiming to maximize total research efforts, should therefore allocate a given prize sum to a single prize rather than to several ones.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:175:y:2019:i:c:p:118-120
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29