Incentive effects: The case of belief elicitation from individuals in groups

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2011
Volume: 111
Issue: 1
Pages: 30-33

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Non-incentivized belief elicitation has a negative effect on the belief accuracy of experienced observers predicting choices in 2 x 2 matrix games. This negative impact extends to the accuracy of group beliefs and revised beliefs after forecasters know each other's initial beliefs.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:1:p:30-33
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29