Learning and Equilibrium Selection in a Monetary Overlapping Generations Model with Sticky Prices

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2003
Volume: 70
Issue: 4
Pages: 887-907

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study adaptive learning in a monetary overlapping generations model with sticky prices and monopolistic competition for the case where learning agents observe current endogenous variables. Observability of current variables is essential for informational consistency of the learning setup with the model setup but generates multiple temporary equilibria when prices are flexible and prevents a straightforward construction of the learning dynamics. Sticky prices overcome this problem by avoiding simultaneity between prices and price expectations. Adaptive learning then robustly selects the determinate (monetary) steady state independent from the degree of imperfect competition. The indeterminate (non-monetary) steady state and non-stationary equilibria are never stable. Stability in a deterministic version of the model may differ because perfect foresight equilibria can be the limit of restricted perceptions equilibria of the stochastic economy with vanishing noise and thereby inherit different stability properties. This discontinuity at the zero variance of shocks suggests one should analyse learning in stochastic models. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:70:y:2003:i:4:p:887-907
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24