Local interactions under switching costs

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2017
Volume: 64
Issue: 3
Pages: 571-588

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract We study the impact of switching costs on the long-run outcome in $$2\times 2$$ 2 × 2 coordination games played in the circular city model of local interactions. For low levels of switching costs, the predictions are in line with the previous literature and the risk-dominant convention is the unique long-run equilibrium. For intermediate levels of switching costs, the set of long-run equilibria still contain the risk-dominant convention but may also contain conventions that are not risk dominant. The set of long-run equilibria may further be non-monotonic in the level of switching costs, i.e., as switching costs increase the prediction that the risk-dominant convention is the unique long-run equilibrium and the prediction that both conventions are long-run equilibria alternate. Finally, for high levels of switching costs, also non-monomorphic states will be included in the set of long-run equilibria.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:64:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-016-1002-3
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29