On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2024
Volume: 145
Issue: C
Pages: 137-156

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This study investigates how the exogenous provision of norm information concerning wage inequality influences the acceptance of wage differences. In an experiment where one employer interacts with two employees who differ in productivities, two main treatments provide information suggesting either an injunctive norm for small or for large wage differences prior to the interaction.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:145:y:2024:i:c:p:137-156
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29