Multirater Performance Evaluations and Incentives

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 2025
Volume: 43
Issue: 4
Pages: 985 - 1004

Authors (3)

Axel Ockenfels (not in RePEc) Dirk Sliwka (not in RePEc) Peter Werner (Maastricht University)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multirater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms this prediction and finds evidence that this can indeed be attributed to accurate information processing in the group. Moreover, when employee compensation depends on evaluations, multirater evaluations tend to be associated with higher performance.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/730321
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29