Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2013
Volume: 103
Issue: 3
Pages: 393-97

Authors (2)

Eric Posner (not in RePEc) E. Glen Weyl (University of Chicago)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Calls for benefit-cost analysis in rule-making, based on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, have revealed a paucity of work on allocative efficiency in financial markets. We propose three principles to help fill this gap. First, we highlight the need for quantifying the statistical cost of a crisis to trade off the risk of a crisis against loss of growth during good times. Second, we propose a framework quantifying the social value of price discovery, and highlighting which arbitrages are over- and under-supplied from a social perspective. Finally, we distinguish between insurance benefits and gambling-facilitation harms of market completion.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:3:p:393-97
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29