The Freedom of Information Act and the Race Toward Information Acquisition

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2017
Volume: 30
Issue: 6
Pages: 2179-2228

Authors (3)

Antonio Gargano (not in RePEc) Alberto G. Rossi (not in RePEc) Russ Wermers (University of Maryland)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We document a little-known source of information exploited by sophisticated institutional investors: the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a law that allows for the disclosure of previously unreleased information by the U.S. Government. Through FOIA requests, we identify several sophisticated institutional investors, chiefly hedge funds, that request information from the FDA. We explore the type of information commonly requested by funds and the types of firms that are targets of FDA-FOIA requests and show that FOIA requests allow these investors to generate abnormal returns. Thus, we illustrate a detailed mechanism through which costly information becomes incorporated into market prices.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:30:y:2017:i:6:p:2179-2228.
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29