Making More from Less: Strategic Demand Reduction in the FCC Spectrum Auctions

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 1997
Volume: 6
Issue: 3
Pages: 529-548

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

When multiple items are sold through the use of simultaneous ascending‐bid auctions, bidders can find it in their mutual interests to reduce their aggregate demand for the items while prices are still low relative to the bidders' valuations. The FCC's first broadband PCS auction provides examples of how such mutual reductions might be arranged even when the bidders are not allowed to communicate with one another outside of the auction arena.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:6:y:1997:i:3:p:529-548
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29