Leverage and preemptive selling of financial institutions

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Intermediation
Year: 2013
Volume: 22
Issue: 2
Pages: 123-151

Authors (2)

Bernardo, Antonio E. (not in RePEc) Welch, Ivo (University of California-Los A...)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In our model, financial firms’ leverage choices and asset sales impose negative externalities on other financial firms. This means that individual firms cannot determine their optimal capitalizations in isolation, but have to take the aggregate financial sector characteristics into account. In particular, they become more aggressive when their peers are more conservative. Furthermore, financial firms over-consume liquidity in equilibrium. For some parameter regions, small parameter changes can induce large differences in the equilibrium allocation of risk. Historical experience is not necessarily a good guide as to whether the prevailing equilibrium is fragile or not.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinin:v:22:y:2013:i:2:p:123-151
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29